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NONRECOURSE FINANCING AND 
TAX SHELTER ABUSE: THE 
CRANE DOCTRINE BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE AT RISK 
PROVISIONS 
Michael Gurwitz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Tax shelters owe their existence, whether intended or not, 
to our statutory scheme of taxation. l Congress has enacted pro-
visions to channel investments into targeted areas to promote 
economic and social policy.s Thus the investment creditS and ac-
* Third Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. A tax shelter frees current income from current tax liability. This income isJrom 
two sources. It may arise from the activity of the tax shelter ("related" income), or it 
may be from some other source ("unrelated" income). There are three main sheltering 
features, deferral, leverage, and conversion, although a given tax shelter may not contain 
them all. 
Deferral is the postponement of tax liability. This is achieved by the generation of 
deductions which are then used as offsets against income. In the prototypical tax shelter, 
these deductions exceed the income produced by the tax shelter (at least in the early 
years of the activity) and are thus available to offset unrelated income. 
Leverage is the use of borrowed funds in the tax shelter activity. Under the tax laws, 
it is the purchase price and not the out-of-pocket investment that determines the tax 
consequences. The deductions are the same whether the taxpayer pays all or only a part 
with his own funds. It is therefore possible for the taxpayer to deduct an amount greater 
than his investment, through the use of borrowed funds. 
Conversion takes place when the amount deducted, which was used to offset ordi-
nary income, becomes gain from the sale of a capital asset and is thus taxed at capital 
gains rates. 
For a more detailed discussion of tax shelters, including analysis of specific types of 
shelters, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 1ST SEaS., OVERVIEW OF 
TAX SHELTERS 1 (Comm. Print 1976). 
2. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897, 2898-99. 
3. I.R.C. §§ 38, 46-48 (1954). The investment credit is generally available for tangi-
ble property (except buildings and their components) which have a useful life (see note 
51 infra) of at least 3 years. It is taken in the taxable year during which it is put into 
service by the taxpayer. As a credit against tax, it acts as a tax forgiveness against other 
income of the taxpayer. There is no element of deferral because this uncollected tax will 
609 
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celerated depreciation4 were enacted to induce investment in. 
capital equipment to modernize our industrial base, while the 
deductibility of interest paymentsll supports the goal of individ-
ual home ownership. 
However, these statutory inducements predictably result in 
some "investments [that] are motivated by excessive concern 
with the tax benefits associated with them, [and] not their eco-
nomic merits."8 This is the result because the Internal Revenue 
Service provisions are written in broad terms and are embel-
lished by (1) judicial interpretations that enhance the positive 
short term tax advantages available on certain types of invest-
ments, while sowing confusion regarding the potential longer 
term liabilities involved; (2) the effects of inflation and two in-
come families driving more taxpayers into high tax brackets 
from which they seek relief; and (3) promoters who, in the classi-
cal American tradition, find a need and fill it. 
As this situation developed over time, Congress made peri-
odic attempts to remedy the problem.7 One such remedy was the 
not become due (there may be some later liability if the property is taken out of service 
by the taxpayer before the expiration of its original useful life). 
4. I.R.C. § 167 states in pertinent part: "(a) ... There shall be allowed as a depreci-
ation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a 
reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or 
(2) of property held for the production of income." 
Any "reasonable allowance" that produces deductions in excess of the straight line 
method for the early years of the property's life is considered accelerated depreciation. 
5. I.R.C. § 163(a) provides that "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest 
paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." 
6. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3445. 
7. For example, deferral has been attacked by the minimum and maximum taxes 
using the concept of tax preference items. Conversion has been addressed by limiting its 
availability. 
Excessive use of tax preference items is attacked in two ways. A tax preference item 
(l.R.C. § 57) is personal current income that is not subject to current taxation. The items 
most relevant to the usual taxpayer engaged in a tax shelter activity are the excluded 
portion of a capital gain (currently 60% of the gain), and the amount of excess deprecia-
tion taken (excess equals actual depreciation minus straight line). After computing the 
taxpayer's tentative tax liability, the minimum tax (I.R.C. § 56) assesses an amount 
equal to 15% of the difference between the sum of the tax preferences and the larger of 
$10,000 and one-half of the tentative tax. The maximum tax on earned income (I.R.C. § 
1348) is 50% while the maximum tax on other income is 70%. The rate on earned in-
come was reduced below the other rate to reduce the incentive to generate tax shelter 
deductions. As a further penalty, the amount of tax preference items in excess of $30,000 
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adoption of the so-called "At Risk Provisions"8 (ARP) of the 
1976 Tax Reform Act.9 This was intended to deal with abuses 
arising from the use of nonrecourse financinglO in certain types 
of activities.ll Nonrecourse financing has been an accepted part 
• 
of tax shelter planning since the Supreme Courts's holding in 
Crane v. CommissionerI2 in 1947. 
This Comment will examine the history of nonrecourse 
financing and tax shelters from the fabled Crane holding to the 
new reality of the ARP. This will be done by dividing the Com-
ment into four parts. Part I will discuss the period preceding the 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, focusing on the Crane 
doctrine and subsequent attempts by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) to define and limit the use of nonrecourse debt. Part 
IT will highlight the- factors that contributed to the growing 
abuse of tax shelters. Part m, in general terms, will examine the 
statutory scheme of the ARP, including the proposed regulations 
and several Revenue Rulings interpreting the statute. IS Part IV 
will shift that amount of earned income into "unearned" income subject to a higher rate 
of taxation. 
Conversion has been limited by the addition of the "recapture" provisions of I.R.C. 
§§ 1245, 1250. When depreciable property is sold for a gain, depreciation is "recaptured" 
as ordinary income, not as a capital gain. In the case of most real property (I.R.C. § 
1250) only the excess depreciation over straight line is so reclassified, while all other 
property is subject to recapture of all depreciation taken. 
8. I.R.C. § 465 [hereinafter referred to as the ARPj. 
9. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
10. In a nonrecourse loan there is no personal liability for repayment by the bor-
rower. Typically, the purchased property is the sole security given. Thus the lender's 
only recourse on default is to force the sale of the security. 
11. See I.R.C. § 465(c). The primary exclusion from the ambit of these provisions is 
the ownership of real property. 
12. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
13. A Treasury Regulation is an official interpretation of an Internal Revenue Code 
section. As such, it is presumptively valid. It may be attacked on the ground that it does 
not comply with congressional intent. In theory, either party may attack the validity of 
the regulation, but the IRS only infrequently attacks its own regulations. Thus, comply-
ing with a regulation offers a "safe harbor" from IRS entanglements. 
A Proposed Regulation has no official current force or effect. It does serve at least 
two functions. This "draft" of a regulation advises tax planners on what the official IRS 
interpretation will be. It also allows for criticism, so that the "bugs" may be removed 
before the final regulation is released. Given the advanced warning, the final regulation 
may be given retroactive effect and cover the period during which the Proposed Regula-
tion was released. This can be done when the underlying statute has been in force during 
the applicable period. 
A Revenue Ruling is an IRS opinion on a fact situation that is considered to have 
more than limited applicability. It has no evidentiary value, but does indicate the proba-
ble position that the IRS will take in a given controversy. It should be noted, however, 
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will discuss the current status of the Crane doctrine. 
I. DEVELOPING THE CRANE DOCTRINE 
A. THE Crane DECISION 
As a preliminary matter, certain terms need to be defined. 
Generally, the taxpayer's "basis" in property is "the cost of such 
property."I. However, when the property is inherited, the basis 
in the hands of the acquiring party is "the fair market value of 
the property at the date of the decedents's death/'IG Adjust-
ments to basis are made to 0 reflect depreciation16 deductions 
taken under section 167.1'1 Upon sale or other disposition of the 
property, the amount realized is "the sum of any money received 
plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) 
received."IB "The gain from the sale or other disposition of prop-
erty shall be the excess of the,amount realized ..• over the ad-
justed basis. . . . me 
Any discussion of the use of nonrecourse financing for tax 
sheltered transactions must start with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Crane v. Commissioner.20 In simplified form, the facts of 
Crane are as follows. Mrs. Crane inherited an apartment build-
ing and land from her husband during the Great Depression. It 
had a fair market value of $250,000 and was subject to a mort-
gage in the same amount. She operated the property for several 
years and claimed depreciation deductions totalling $25,000. 
With the mortgagee threatening to foreclose, she sold the prop-
erty subject to the mortgage to a third party for $2,500 cash net. 
She argued that the "property" she inherited was the eq-
uity-the fair market value of the property less, the encum-
brances on it. Thus it would have had a zero value and therefore 
a zero basis in her hands when she inherited it. No depreciation 
that the IRS is much more likely to change its 'Position in a Revenue Ruling than in a 
Treasury Regulation. 
140 I.R.C. § 1012. Basis should be viewed as the measure of the actual economic 
investment made by the purchaser to obtain the property. 
15. Ido § 1014. This "stepped up" basis is in contrast to the treatment of gifts where 
the donee's basis is the same as that of the donor. See [do § 1015. 
16. [do § 1016(a)(2). 
17. [do § 167. 
18. Id. § 1001(b). 
19. [d. § 1001(a). 
20. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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can be taken on a zero basis and, because neither she nor the 
transferee ever assumed the mortgage, her amount realized was 
the $2,500.21 Therefore her gain was $2,500 (the amount realized 
minus the zero basis). 
The Commissioner computed the taxpayer's gain as $27,500. 
His theory was that the "property" inherited was the real estate 
undiminished by the mortgage, so that her basis under section 
101422 was $250,000, the adjusted basis under section 101623 was 
$225,000 ($250,000 minus depreciation of $25,000), and the 
amount realized was $252,500 ($2,500 in cash plus the $250,000 
mortgage subject to which the buyer took the property). Thus, 
the "gain" was $252,500 minus $225,000 as per section 1001.24 
The Court agreed with the Commissioner. It gave three rea-
sons for concluding that "property" meant the real estate and 
not the "equity." First, the "ordinary, everyday" dictionary defi-
nition of property is either "the physical thing which is a subject 
of ownership, or . . . it is the aggregate of the owner's rights to 
control and dispose of that thing" and neither is a synonym for 
"equity."215 Second, neither Congress nor the Treasury has ever 
been confused in their uses of these terms and, further, because 
Congress had long been silent in the face of Treasury Regula-
tions which had used "property" in the ordinary sense, this in-
terpretation may now be considered to have the force of law.28 
Third, the Court was concerned with the effect depreciation 
would have on adjustments to basis if "property" meant "eq-
uity." Significant administrative problems would be created be-
cause the basis would constantly need to be recomputed as 
mortgage payments reduced the outstanding principal and in-
creased equity.2'1 
21. 331 U.S. at 3. This argument was inconsistent with the reality of the deprecia-
tion deductions of $25,000 actually taken by the taxpayer. However, this inconsistencY 
does not go to the merits of the case, because the IRS would here have been able, subject 
to the statute of linIitations, to assess deficiencies for these deductions if the taxpayer· 
had prevailed. 
22. I.R.C. § 1014. 
23. [d. § 1016. 
24. [d. § l00l(a). 
25. 331 U.S. at 6-7. 
26. [d. at 8. 
27. [d. at 9-10. 
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Finding that the basis was the value of the property un-
reduced by the mortgage, the Court then quite easily found that 
the taxpayer was the appropriate party to be entitled to depreci-
ation, reserving judgment on whether the result would be differ-
ent if the unassumed mortgage was worth less than the value of 
the property.28 
Turning to the determination of the "amount realized," the 
Court rejected the proposition that this amount could be as little 
as $2,500.29 It continued by pointing out that there need not be 
an actual receipt by the seller of money or other property for an 
amount to be considered as part of the "amount realized."30 Of 
significance was the following analysis by the Court: 
we think that a mortgagor, not personally liable 
on the debt, who sells the property subject to the 
mortgage and for additional consideration, real-
izes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as 
well as the boot .... We are ... concerned with 
the reality that an owner of property, mortgaged 
at a figure less than that at which the property 
will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the 
mortgage exactly as if they were his personal 
obligations.31 
Therefore, the Court approved the Commissioner's inclusion of 
the amount of the unassumed mortgage in the amount realized. 
In its now famous footnote thirty-seven,32 the Court reserved 
judgment as to whether this would be proper if the mortgage 
exceeded the value of the property. To add additional emphasis, 
the Court pointed out that the "crux of this case, really, is 
28. Id. at 11. On the authority of Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939), 
that depreciation is allowed to the party actually bearing the capital loss, Mrs. Crane 
argued that she was not the appropriate party. Because she was not personally liable for 
the mortgage, she felt the mortgagee should be entitled to the depreciation allowance. Id. 
at 11 & 11 n.32. 
29. Id. at 14. 
30. Id. at 13. 
31. Id. at 14. 
32. Id. at 14 n.37. Footnote 37 states in full: 
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount 
of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable can-
not realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a 
different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor 
abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mort-
gage without receiving boot. That is not this case. 
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whether the law permits [the taxpayer] to exclude allowable de-
ductions from consideration in computing gain. "33 
B. THE BASIC CONCEPT 
There has been a significant amount of literature focusing 
on the Crane decision and its implications.34 It has included 
opinions concluding that the Court reached the wrong result,3!> 
that it reached the proper result for the wrong reason,36 and an 
imaginary Supreme Court decision deciding the meaning of the 
famous footnote.37 This Comment's focus, however, is limited to 
the meaning and scope of the Crane doctrine and will not at-
tempt to critique the Supreme Court's analysis. It has been 
noted that the Supreme Court had its choice of three unpalat-
able determinations.38 First, it could have found that the differ-
ences between nonrecourse and personal liability were signifi-
cant enough to warrant different tax treatments. However, in 
many instances there are no true economic differences between 
the twO.39 A second possibility would have been to find that a 
case by case analysis was necessary to determine the appropriate 
33. Id. at 15. 
34. Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary 
Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REv. 159 (1966); Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse 
Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277 (1978); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount 
Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects In Mortgage Financing, 
118 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1969); Gallagher, Fiscal Alchemy and the Crane Rule: Alternative 
Solutions to the Tax Shelter, 8 CONN. L. REv. 607 (1976); Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax 
Shelter, 53 TAXES 719 (1975); Javaras, Nonrecourse Debt in Real Estate and Other In-
vestments, 56 TAXES 801 (1978); Landis, Liabilities and Purchase Price, 27 TAX LAW. 67 
(1973); Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 
TAX L. REV. 525 (1972). 
35. Del Cotto, supra note 34, at 73. The author argued that the question was not the 
meaning of the word "property" alone but the meaning of the statutory phrase "property 
acquired by • • • devise." Since the fair market value of the real estate equalled the 
mortgage when Mrs. Crane inherited it, the only way to get the underlying property was 
to pay for it. "It is a strange inheritance that must be purchased!" Id. The value of the 
property inherited must therefore be zero. 
36. Bittker, supra note 34, at 284. Bittker argues that the economic benefit rationale 
of the Court in Crane is wrong. He thinks that the "amount realized" should include the 
face value of the indebtedness as a balancing entry to bring tax results into conformity 
with economic results. 
37. Adams, supra note 34. 
38. Bittker, supra note 34, at 282. 
39. For example, if a corporation's only asset is the purchased property, there is no 
meaningful difference. This occurs where a sale to a lessor is involved and the lender is 
looking primarily to the value of the property, and the presence or absence of personal 
liability by the lessor is relatively unimportant. 
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treatment for nonrecourse debt and basis inclusion. This would 
have created great uncertainty and administrative inefficiency. 
The path chosen by the Court was to treat personal and nonre-
course liability uniformly. 
Such uniform treatment does not mean that nonrecourse in-
debtedness will be automatically included in basis. What it does 
mean is that it will not be excluded solely on the ground that 
there is no personalliability."'o We will now examine the cases 
subsequent to Crane, to follow the development of the doctrine 
and determine the limits of its applicability. The IRS has at-
tempted to prevent nonrecourse debt from being included in ba-
sis, using arguments that the purchase price (or part of it) was 
too contingent or speculative to be included in basis, or that the 
transaction was something other than a sale, such as a lease or 
option. 
C. REFINEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE 
In Mayerson v. Commissioner41 the taxpayer was offered an 
office building for a cash price of $275,000. Because of the age 
and condition of the property, the taxpayer was unable to ar-
range third party financing. The arrangement that was worked 
out waS for a purchase price of $332,500 with $10,000 to be paid 
initially and the remainder payable pursuant to a nonrecourse 
ninty-nine-year mortgage at 6% interest with principal pay-
ments not required. Additionally, the purchase price would be 
reduced to $275,000 if paid in the first year, and $298,000 if paid 
in the second. At the time, it was understood that the taxpayer 
would attempt to secure conventional financing. Five years sub-
sequent to taking possession, the taxpayer renegotiated the bal-
ance due on the purchase price by paying $200,000 in cash. 
The IRS argued that the transaction was merely a long term 
40. In subsequent cases Crane has been extended to the purchase of property as 
well as inherited property. See Blackstone Theatre v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801 
(1949)(Taxpayer purchased property subject to tax liens. Held, the amount of the liens is 
includable in taxpayer's basis); Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. 
denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951)(Taxpayer, who was not personally liable on the mortgage, 
turned property back to the mortgagee. Held, the amount realized was equal to the in-
debtedness, where the fair market value of the property equalled the amount of the 
mortgage. In essence this was Crane without the presence of boot). 
41. 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59. 
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lease coupied with an option to buy because of the indefinite 
price, the absence of recourse, the small initial payment, and the 
ninty-nine-year lease."s The Tax Court held for the taxpayer. 
The court found that there was no indication of sham, and that 
there was a clear intent by the parties to conclude a sale!S It 
further found that there was no intent to allow the mortgage to 
run for its stated 99-year term!" 
In furtherance of the notion that the Crane doctrine stands 
for the uniform treatment of personal and nonrecourse liabilities 
for inclusion in basis, the court reasoned that "[t]axpayers who 
are not personally liable for encumbrances on property should 
be allowed depreciation deductions affording competitive equal-
ity with taxpayers who are personally liable for encumbrances or 
taxpayers who own unencumbered property.""5 It went on to say 
that the "effect of such a policy is to give the taxpayer an ad-
vance credit for the amount of the mortgage. This appears to be 
reasonable since it can be assumed that a capital investment in 
the amount of the mortgage will eventually occur despite the ab-
sence of personal liability.""e Finally, after deciding that there 
should be basis inclusion, the court opted for the full $332,000 
rather than a reduced amount, because the discount "merely 
provided an incentive for very early retirement of the mortgage 
which did not occur.""" 
In Roemer v. Commissioners the taxpayer negotiated a 
purchase price of $275,000, which was to be reduced to $200,000 
if paid within six years and ten months. The Tax Court disal-
lowed the inclusion of the $75,POO discolplt in basis because of 
the compelling incentive to pay the note off within the discount 
period. In doing so, the court determined that this discount was 
too speculative to be included in the taxpayer's basis. 
In Marcus v. Commissioner"9 the taxpayer had purchased 
several bowling alleys. In each case a purchase price at well over 
42. ld. at 350. 
43. ld. at 352. 
44.ld. 
45.ld. 
46.ld. 
47. ld. at 354. 
48. 69 T.C. 440 (1977). 
49. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1971), aff'd in an unreported decision (3d Cir. 1974). 
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fair market value was negotiated subject to a nonrecourse note 
with no interest due.tlo Further, the useful lifetl1 chosen by the 
taxpayer was substantially less than the term of the note. The 
Tax Court found that because many of the payments on the 
note were due after the useful life of the assets had expired, the 
chance of payments was not substantial enough, in light of the 
lack of liability on the part of the taxpayer, and the entire 
amount of the note was excluded from basis because the tax-
payer's liability was "contingent and not ascertainable."tl2 How-
ever, the court did allow the taxpayer to deduct as depreciation 
payments actually made on the notes under the principle of As-
sociated Patentees v. Commissionerll3 that each payment reflects 
the annual cost of ownership and use. lH 
This is a confusing decision because in the court's logic only 
payments scheduled after the expiration of the useful life were 
too contingent to be ascertained. It would have been reasonable 
50. The purchase price was calculated as the sum of the fair market value of the 
property plus all the interest that would be paid over the term of the note assuming a 
6% interest rate. This arrangement allowed the seller to receive capital gains treatement 
for the interest portion of the payments, which otherwise would have been received as 
ordinary income, and the purchaser to use accelerated depreciation on the interest 
amounts by having them included in his basis. This was a common practice at the time 
and did not affect the court's decision. 
This abuse has been addressed by § 483, which imputes a minimum rate of inter-
est on such transactions. Currently this rate is 7%. See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-
1( c) (2)(ii)(B)(1980). 
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b)(1978) states in pertinent part that "the ... useful 
life of an asset is not necessarily the useful life inherent in the asset but is the period 
over which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade 
or business or in the production of his income." 
52. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1273. A leading case is Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964) (Taxpayer pur-
chased assets and assumed liabilities of predecessor. Taxpayer valued a liability for sev-
erence pay under a union contract at $50,000, even though it had negotiated a much 
more favorable arrangement with the union and attempted to include that amount in its 
basis. Held, liability not includable for two reasons: one, because of all the contingent 
factors, no set sum could be estimated; two, under the renegotiated contract the likeli-
hood of future liability was too speculative). See also Columbus and Greenville Ry. v. 
Commissionei', 42 T.C. 834 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1966); 
Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773 (1957); Rev. Rul. 55-675, 1955-2 C.B. 567. 
53. 4 T.C. 979 (1945) In Associated Patentees the taxpayer purchased patents in 
return for a promise to pay 80% of the income from them to sellers. Taxpayer paid 
sellers $42,000 in the taxable year and attempted to deduct that amount as a royalty 
payment. Held, the payment was a capital expenditure in acquisition of the patents, but 
it was a reasonable allowance for the depreciation of the patents and was thus deductible 
in the taxable year. 
54. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1274. 
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to allow inclusion in basis for those amounts due before the use-
fullife had been exceeded. Alternatively, because the seller's ac-
tions clearly indicated that the useful life of the bowling alleys 
was at least as long as the term of the note, the court might have 
found that the taxpayer was using too short a useful life, and 
merely disallowed excess deductions based on the shorter life as-
sumed by the taxpayer. 
In Bolger v. Commissione~r. a format frequently used by 
the taxpayer was challenged by the IRS. Typically, the taxpayer 
would form a financing corporation with an initial capitalization 
of $1,000. The corporation would then purchase property after it 
had located a suitable tenant. In short order, often on the same 
day, (1) the seller would convey title, (2) a net leaser.s" would be 
entered into, (3) financing would be obtained from an institu-
tional lender, and (4) the corporation would then convey the 
property to its shareholders, subject to the lease and mortgage 
and without any cash payment or promise thereof by the share-
holders. The shareholders, as the owners of the property, then 
claimed depreciation deductions which were contested by the 
Commissioner. Quoting liberally from Mayersonr.'1 and invoking 
the spirit of Crane, r.s the Tax Court argued that if the taxpayer 
had been personally liable on the mortgage there would be no 
question that the amount of the debt would be includable in his 
basis, and because it had been stipulated that the fair market 
value of the property was not less than the amount of the mort-
gage, there would be an immediate equity in the property, which 
was enough to ensure that the taxpayer would treat the liability 
as if it were his own. r.9 Therefore, the taxpayer could include the 
amount of the mortgage in his basis and take depreciation based 
on that amount. 
Carnegie Productions v. Commissionerso is an example of a 
movie tax shelter that was unsuccessful. The taxpayer entered 
into an agreement with Columbia Pictures, whereby in exchange 
55. 59 T.C. 760 (1973). 
56. The court said that "payment by the lessee of all taxes, insurance, repairs, etc., 
... [indicates] a net lease." ld. at 762. 
57. ld. at 770. 
58.ld. 
59. ld. 
60. 59 T.C. 642 (1973). 
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for Columbia's payment of $75,000 and its promise to provide all 
funds necessary for completion of the film (with the taxpayer 
not liable for repayment of the advances), taxpayer would pro-
duce and deliver to Columbia a finished motion picture based on 
a screenplay he owned. In addition, upon receipt of the picture 
by Columbia, taxpayer would convey the sole, exclusive, and ir-
revocable right to rent, lease, license, exhibit, distribute, and 
otherwise use the picture, and to have all rights available under 
the copyright, including the renewal term. Taxpayer then 
claimed a depreciation deduction based on the total cost of mak-
ing the film. The court had no trouble in concluding that 
"[fjrom the terms of the contract and an examination of the ac-
tions of the parties, the conclusion is inescapable that Columbia 
became the real 'owner' ."SI The taxpayer had retained nothing 
that could be considered a depreciable interest; therefore the de-
pre.ciation was disallowed. S2 
A case not dealing with nonrecourse debt but potentially 
relevant for its holding concerning a different kind of deduction, 
is Goldstein v. Commissioner.ss The taxpayer won $140,000 in 
the Irish Sweepstakes. She then borrowed a large sum of money 
at 4 % interest, prepaid $80,000 worth of interest, and invested 
the remaining loan proceeds in U.S. Treasury Notes paying be-
tween 1 % and 1lh %. Although the statute that permits the de-
duction of all interest paid on indebtedness is silent as to intent 
and clearly does not require a business motive/I. the court none-
theless found that there must be a purpose apart from the antic-
ipated tax consequences to qualify for deductibility.s5 Therefore 
the $80,000 interest deduction was totally disallowed. 
The final case to be examined is Estate of Franklin v. Com-
missioner.ss A limited partnership of which decedent was a 
member had purchased land and a motel building. The motel 
had been purchased by the sellers a few months before for ap-
proximately $660,000. The partnership purchased this property 
for $1,224,000 payable as follows: 
61. ld. at 653. 
62. ld. at 653-54. 
63. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1966). 
64. See I.R.C. § 163(a); text of section at note 5 supra. 
65. 364 F.2d at 740. 
66. 64 T.C. 752 (1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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[1] $75,000 paid as prepaid interest at the time of sale; 
[2] Monthly payments for a ten-year period based on a 25-
year amortization schedule at 7~ % interest. At the same 
time the partnership net leased67 the motel to the seller for 
the same amount of rent; 
[3] The approximate balance of $975,000 was payable ten 
years after the sale on a nomecourse basis, less the amount 
of any mortgages on the property by the sellers. 
The IRS disallowed the taxpayer's share of the partnership 
losses, arguing that the transaction was either a sham or an op-
tion to buy the property after ten years. The Tax Court agreed 
with the IRS that the transaction merely amounted to an option. 
It distinguished Crane and Mayerson because this situation in-
volved a variable price determined ten years later, the seller re-
tained significant indicia of ownership, and the purchase price 
had no relation to current value but did resemble an option to 
purchase at a later date. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the disallowance 
of basis inclusion but for its own reason. For the Ninth Circuit, 
the key was that the purchase price had not been shown to ap-
proximate the fair market value.6S To the court there would not 
be a buildup of equity which would entice the taxpayer to con-
tinue to make payments on the note.69 The court reserved judg-
ment on what adjustments to basis would need to be made in 
the event that an equity position was reached.70 This holding is 
squarely in agreement with the IRS position taken in Revenue 
Ruling 69-77 that where the transaction is designed to "improp-
erly create or inflate depreciation deductions . . . the Service 
will disallow unwarranted depreciation deductions."7l 
Except for the aberrant Marcus decision,72 a consistent 
theme that nomecourse debt is generally available for basis in-
67. ld. at 762; See note 56 supra. 
68. 544 F.2d at 1048. Of significance is the court's determination that the taxpayer 
had failed to satisfy his burden of proof to demonstrate that the price paid was a reason-
able one. This holding marks the first time a court concluded that the taxpayer needed 
to make an affirmative showing of value. 
69.ld. 
70. ld. at 1048-49. 
71. Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59. 
72. For a discussion of Marcus, see text accompanying notes 49-54 supra. 
13
Gurwitz: Tax Shelter Abuse
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
622 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.ll:609 
clusion emerges from the cases. Prior to the Franklin holding, 
this meant that if a showing was made that a bona fide transac-
tion was intended by the parties, basis inclusion would follow. 
Franklin, to the degree that it is precedent, limits such transac-
tions to purchases for reasonable value so there is real likelihood 
that the mortgage will be repaid. Franklin further holds that the 
burden is on the taxpayer to establish the reasonableness of the 
purchase price. '73 
D. The "Amount Realized" Controversy of the Crane 
DOCTRINE 
Once the issue of basis inclusion has been resolved favora-
bly, what remains is the resolution of the "amount realized" 
problem on the sale or other disposition of the property. Where 
the fair market value of the property exceeds the indebtedness, 
Crane holds that amount realized includes the face amount of 
any nonrecourse indebtedness.'74 Not so easily disposed of is the 
situation in which the indebtedness exceeds the value of the 
property. This is the situation envisioned in footnote thirty-
seven of Crane.'7G As late as 1978, one commentator opined that 
this issue was still unresolved.'76 In fact, there has been a clear 
split in the literature as to what the correct resolution should 
be.'7'7 
Let us consider a hypothetical situation. Taxpayer (T) 
purchases a building worth $5,000 for the inflated price of 
$10,000, with $1,000 down and a nonrecourse note for the re-
maining $9,000. Thus T has a basis of $10,000 in the property. 
Assume T operates the building for a time during which $3,000 
of allowable depreciation is taken, thus reducing T's adjusted 
basis to $7,000. If T then defaults, what is the "amount real-
ized"?'78 The Court in Crane included the amount of the nonre-
course mortgage in the "amount realized," because it was con-
V-inced that the taxpayer was receiving an economic benefit 
equal to that received by a mortgagor who had assumed personal 
73. For a discussion of Franklin, see text accompanying notes 66-71 supra. 
74. 331 U.S. at 14; see text accompanying note 31 supra. 
75. Id. at 14 n.37; see note 32 supra. 
76. Bittker, supra note 34, at 284. 
77. For citations, see McGuire, Negative Capital Accounts and the Failing Tax 
Shelter, 3 J. REAL ESTATE TAX 439, 440-42 (1976). ' 
78. I.R.C. § 1001(b). 
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liability.79 
Clearly there is no such equivalent benefit here. But how 
should the benefit be measured? In United States v. Davis80 the 
Supreme Court held that to determine the value of property re-
ceived in an arm's length transaction, one must look to the value 
of the property given up. Combining the economic benefit ratio-
nale of Crane and the fair market value of Davis, it can be ar-
gued that the amount realized is the fair market value of the 
abandoned building, which for purposes of this hypothetical is 
still $5,000. Thus T would realize a gain of $5,000 minus $7,000 
or a loss of $2,000! In this way, T is "punished" for this uneco-
nomic transaction in which deductions of $3,000 were received 
to shelter other unrelated income, and also suffers an additional 
capital loss of $2,000 for tax purposes. Alternatively, if the 
"amount realized" was held to include the full value of the mort-
gage, T would be found to have a taxable gain of $3,000 which 
effectively reclaims the deductions previously taken. 
Not surprisingly then, the ms rejected footnote thirty-
seven of Crane. The Service has held that where a debtor sur-
rendered property securing a nonrecourse loan to a creditor in 
payment of the loan, "the transfer of assets in . . . cancellation 
of indebtedness is equivalent to a sale upon which gain or loss is 
recognized in the amount of the . . . indebtedness . . . can-
celled" and that "whatever inference may be drawn from foot-
note 37 in the Crane case," the amount of indebtedness can-
celled "is the amount realized. "81 It must be noted that although 
the concept of cancellation of indebtedness income was well es-
tablished,82 no court, at that time, had ever held that the dis-
charge of nonrecourse indebtedness results in such income.83 
79. 331 U.S. at 14. 
80. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). 
81. Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214 at 215. 
82. The leading case is United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931). The 
taxpayer had issued notes and then subsequently repurchased them at a discount. The 
difference between the face value and the purchase price was held to generate income on 
the theory that it had freed that amount of the taxpayer's assets. 
83. See Fulton Gold Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934); Hiatt v. Commis-
sioner, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1937); Hotel Astoria, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940). 
The theory behind these decisions is that because there was no personal liability, no 
assets of the taxpayer were freed by the discount on the liability, and thus no income 
was generated. 
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In marked contrast to this heated controversy is the ease 
with which a pre-Crane court resolved this problem. In Lutz & 
Schramm Co. v. Commissione"s" the taxpayer had borrowed 
$300,000 from a lender in 1925. In 1934 the lender accepted a 
nonrecourse note secured by property of the taxpayer in dis-
charge of the debt. The property was transferred in full dis-
." charge of its obligation to the lender in 1937 when it had a fair 
market value of only $97,000. Not forced to deal with the "eco-
nomic benefit" analysis of Crane, the Tax Court found "[t]he 
net result of the transaction was that the [taxpayer] received 
$300,000 for its property. The $300,000 was received by the [tax-
payer] in 1925, but the taxable transaction took place in 
1937 .... "SI5 Further, it noted that taxpayer had "enjoyed the 
full benefit from the receipt of $300,000" by transferring the 
property.S6 
Recently, in Millar v. Commissione"s7 both the Tax Court 
and the Third Circuit joined the ms in rejecting footnote 
thirty-seven. Taxpayers had borrowed $500,000 to purchase 
stock in a corporation. This was secured solely by the stock so 
purchased. When the taxpayers defaulted on the loan, the lender 
foreclosed and took the virtually worthless stock. Echoing the 
sentiment expressed above in Lutz & Schramm Co., the Third 
Circuit stated: 
This finding is totally in keeping with the spirit 
and reasoning of Crane . . . . [T]he taxpayers 
utilized those funds to increase the basis of their 
stock, which then permitted them to claim sizable 
deductions calculated against that basis . . . . 
[T]he taxpayers clearly realized taxable gain 
equal to the value of the cancelled obligation, less 
the adjusted basis of their surrendered stock.88 
What we have seen develop was a potentially two-tiered pol-
84. 1 T.C. 682 (1943). 
85. [d. at 688. 
86. [d. at 689. 
87. 67 T.C. 656 (1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 
(1978). 
88. 577 F.2d at 215. This result was followed in Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 
(1978). There, the taxpayers sold their partnership interests in an apartment complex for 
$1,400,000. The property was subject to nonrecourse indebtedness of $1,810,500. Held; 
the amount realized was $1,810,500. 
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icy concerning nonrecourse indebtedness. On the one hand, to 
afford competitive equality, there was a clear policy to allow in-
clusion of nonrecourse indebtedness in basis. On the other, there 
was at least the implication in footnote thirty-seven of Crane 
that nonrecourse debt would be allowed a competitive advantage 
when the purchased property was disposed of. 
II. DEFINING THE ABUSE 
The pursuit of tax shelters produced "investments . . . mo-
tivated by excessive concern with the tax benefits associated 
with them, [and] not their economic merits."89 To understand 
why this occurred, several factors need to be considered. 
As a general proposition, the adversarial nature of the mar-
ketplace protects against sales in excess of value, that is, those 
sales not economic in substance. In the tax shelter area, this ad-
versarial relationship is definitely weakened when nonrecourse 
debt is involved. A major incentive for the buyer is the presence 
of short-term tax advantages. This is achieved by the bunching 
of deductions in the early years, which allows the taxpayer to 
avoid or defer tax liability on current income from other sources. 
Depreciation, the investment credit, and interest paid on indebt-
edness, are all directly proportional to the purchase price. Thus 
the higher the purchase price the larger the amount of outside 
income that avoids taxation. This is not the stuff that arms-
length transactions are made of. 
The limited partnership was the most commonly used vehi-
cle for the tax sheltered investment. Unlike a corporation, a 
partnership is generally not considered a separate entity for tax 
purposes.90 The individual partners are separately taxed on their 
share of the partnership gains,91 and can deduct partnership 
losses to the extent of the adjusted basis in their partnership 
interest.92 When an investor .enters a partnership, his basis in 
89. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3445. 
90. I.R.C. § 701 states that "[a] partnership as such shall not be subject to the in-
come tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be 
liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities." 
91. [d. § 702(a). 
92. [d. § 704(d). Adjusted basis is defined in I.R.C. § 705. 
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the partnership interest is the amount invested plus his share, if 
'any, of the partnership liabilities.9s Under a Treasury Regulation 
a limited partner may include in his basis his share of t~e nonre-
course loans to the partnership.94 This interpretation puts the 
limited partner on equal footing with the individual investor 
who obtained nonrecourse financing after Crane. It also allows 
the investor to make a relatively small, passive investment and 
still be able to use the advantage of leverage. 
A further factor in the abuse equation was the uncertainty 
surrounding Crane's footnote thirty-seven.915 Given the apparent 
disagreement among the tax professionals about the "amount re-
alized" on a failing shelter and the undoubted fact that, to the 
layman, the concept of having gain in such a situation is 
counter-intuitive, another reason for being unconcerned with the 
fairness of the purchase price develops. 
Not to be overlooked is the enticement of deferral. If a tax 
shelter is able to defer tax liability from year one to year x, then 
another tax shelter in year x may further defer the tax liability. 
Even if the first tax shelter activity had economic substance, a 
significant attraction of the subsequent shelters would be the 
amount of immediate shelter they offer. This also weakens the 
normal adversarial relationship of the parties to a transaction. 
The House Ways and Means Committee noted that many of 
these shelters were economically inefficient because a large per-
centage of the equity raised went to pay syndication fees.96 This 
occurred in part because investors tended to know little about 
the industries they were investing in, thereby cultivating a cli-
mate conducive to waste and fraud.97 The Committee was fur-
ther concerned about "individual's use [of] artificial deductions, 
ones that do not accurately reflect their current expenses, to 
generate losses which they use to offset tax on unrelated in-
come."98 As stated, the Committee's concern was not an attack 
93. [d. § 722. 
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e)(1980). 
95. For a discussion of this uncertainty, see text accompanying notes 74-88 supra. 
96. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897, 2903. 
97. [d. at 8-9; [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2903. 
98. [d. at 8; [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 2903. 
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on the use of nonrecourse financing, but represented a more ba-
sic desire to fundamentally change the underlying structure of 
tax shelters in general. The Committee wanted to limit the shel-
tering ability to the particular activity in which a taxpayer was 
engaged. If the activity generated no income, then no deductions 
would be allowed. 
The Senate Finance Committee' was more directly con-
cerned with abuse generated by the use of nonrecourse loans. It 
wanted to prevent the deduction of tax losses in excess of eco-
nomic risk.99 It found that this abuse was also being achieved by 
the use of "guarantees, stop-loss agreements . . . and other de-
vices" which resulted in amounts for which the taxpayer had no 
real risk of loss being attributed to basis.100 The Finance Com-
mittee was also concerned that these activities were an unpro-
ductive use of investment funds.101 
III. THE "AT RISK" PROVISIONS 
Section 465102 was added to the Internal Revenue Code as 
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Conceptually it adopts the 
Senate's concerns about tax shelter abuse, that is, it attempts to 
limit the amount of loss deductions attributable to a transaction 
to that amount in which the taxpayer has an actual risk of eco-
nomic loss. At the outset one thing should be made clear. Sec-
tion 465 is not a basis rule but rather a limitation on deductions 
related to a particular activity that is income generating. For ex-
ample, consider a taxpayer with an amount at risk of $100 and 
income of $1,000 from certain activity. If the taxpayer's deduc-
tions for that activity total $800 then they will be allowed in full, 
but if the deductions total $1,500 then only $1,100 (the $1,000 
income plus the $100 "at risk") will be allowed in the current 
taxable year. 
Section 465 is applicable10s to individuals,l04 subchapter S 
99. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & An. NEWS 3439, 3482-83. 
100. ld; [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS, at 3483. 
101. ld. 
102. I.R.C. § 465. 
103. As originally enacted, I.R.C. § 465 was limited in scope to those activities enu-
merated in § 465 (c)(l), that is, motion pictures, videotapes, farming, leasing of section 
1245 property, and oil and gas exploration. In addition, a special partnership basis rule, 
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corporations,105 and closely held corporations where five or fewer 
individuals own more than 50 % of the stock/oS unless the entity 
is engaged in real estate, or such closely held corporation is in-
volved in equipment leasing.l07 The heart of the section is its 
determination of the amount at risk in subsection (b).lOB In gen-
eral, the amoUnt at risk is the sum of (1) the amount of money 
and the adjusted basis of property contributed by the taxpayer 
to the activity, and (2) amounts borrowed to be used in the ac-
tivity where the taxpayer is personally liable for repayment.10e 
There are exceptions to this general rule designed to deal 
with suspect borrowing. Thus amounts which are borrowed from 
a person who has an interest in the activity (other than as a 
creditor) or has a section 267(b)1l0 relationship to the taxpayer 
are not considered at risk.lll 
I.R.C. § 704(d), was added to the Code. It provided that, to the extent that § 465 did not 
apply to an activity, the adjusted basis of a partner's interest in the partnership would 
not include any portion of partnership liability for which the partner had no personal 
liability. This combination attacked the problem in two ways. It reduced the leverage 
benefits available to the most popular tax shelter vehicle, the limited partnership, and at 
the SaDle time limited the general scope of statutory regulation to the types of activities 
that were considered most abusive. . 
In the Revenue Act of 1978, I.R.C. § 465 was expanded to its present scope, and the 
special partnership basis rule of § 704(d) was repealed as unnecessary. This was done 
because it was determined that activities not covered by § 465 as originally enacted were 
being abused. 
104. I.R.C. § 565(a)(1)(A). This includes partnerships. See id. § 701. 
105. I.R.C. § 465(a)(1)(C). Subchapter S corporations are defined in id. §§ 1371-79. 
In many ways shareholders of such an electing corporation are treated like limited 
partners. One significant difference is that the corporations' nonrecourse debt is not allo-
cated to the shareholders, so that the amount of loss deductions available is limited to 
the actual investment. 
106. Corporations which are not Subchapter S corporations cannot pass on losses 
directly to their shareholders, thus there is no sheltering of the shareholder's outside 
income. However, in the case of the closely held corporation, there is incentive to keep 
earnings at the corporate level and avoid taxing the dividend income to the shareholder. 
Although the accumulated earnings tax exists to police such activity, it was felt that tax 
shelters were being used solely to generate large paper losses to shield the accumulation 
of corporate earnings from this tax. 
107. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D). 
108. [d. § 465(b). 
109. [d. 
110. [d. § 267(b): For an individual, this category includes close family members and 
corporations which are either directly or indirectly more than 50% owned by the 
individual. 
111. In the past, these types of loans have been the source of abuse. A recourse loan 
from a related party may in reality be nonrecourse. A loan from an interested party mf!Y 
in fact be an investment in the activity. See Rev. Rul. 72-135, 1972-1 C.B. 200; Rev. Rul. 
72-350, 1972-2 C.C. 394. Apparently the presumption is that if the loan is truly recourse, 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss2/5
1981] TAX SHELTER ABUSE 
Proposed Regulation 1.465-8 states that: 
For the purposes of this section it is not necessary 
for a person to have any incidents of ownership in 
the activity in order to have an interest in the net 
profits of the activity. For example, an employee 
of an independent contractor any part 'of whose 
compensation is determined with reference to the 
net profits of the activity will be considered to 
have an interest in the net profits of the 
activity.ll2 
629 
Where borrowed amounts are secured by property not used in 
the activity, these amounts (to the extent of the net fair market 
value of taxpayer's interest in such property) will be included in 
the amount at risk, unless such property is directly or indirectly 
financed by indebtedness secured by property used in the activ-
ity.lls More simply put, if the ultimate source of security for a 
loan arises out of the original activity, the loan amount is not 
considered to be at risk. 
Another limiting factor is stated by Proposed Regulation 
1.465-1(b): "Regardless of the form a transaction may take, the 
taxpayer's amount at risk will not be increased' if the transaction 
is inconsistent with normal commercial practices or is, in es-
sence, a device to avoid section 465."114 This seems to be consis-
tent with the logic in Goldstein denying the interest 
deduction. lUI 
As noted in Part IT, the Senate was concerned with the gen-
eral problem of taxpayers being able to deduct amounts in ex-
cess of true economic liability. Thus, overriding the entire at risk 
definition is section 465(b)(4) which states that 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this section, a tax-
payer shall not be considered at risk with respect to amounts 
protected against loss through nonrecourse financing, guaran-
tees, stop-loss agreements, or other similar arrangements."I1S 
then an independent third party should be the lender. 
112. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465·8, FED. TAXES (P·H) 11 20,648.38 (1979). 
113. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2). 
114. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465·1(b), FED. TAXES (P-H) 11 20,648.31 (1979). 
115. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1966). For a discussion of 
Goldstein, see text accompanying notes 63·65 supra. 
116. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4). 
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Thus to the degree that the taxpayer's investment is protected 
from economic loss, it will not be considered to be at risk. 
The calculation of the amount at risk is done at the close of 
the taxpayer's taxable year.H'1 When an amount is taken as a 
loss deduction, the amount at risk is reduced by that amount. us 
If an amount is not available for deduction because of the appli-
cability of the ARP, such amount is carried forward as a poten-
tially available deduction.u9 Withdrawals of assets from the ac-
tivity that were at risk will reduce the amount at risk, while 
assumption of additional liabilities will increase the amount at 
risk. To police manipulation of the amount at risk (because it is 
calculated at the end of the taxable year only), the IRS will ex-
amine the conduct of the taxpayer to determine the allowance of 
certain adjustments to the amount at risk.120 Further, if the 
amount at risk is reduced below zero (by removing an amount at 
risk from the activity), it will then be recaptured as ordinary 
income.121 For example, if a tentative calculation of the amount 
at risk showed $100, then the removal of $200 of personalliabil-
ity from the activity would, at year end, produce an amount at 
risk of $100. The taxpayer would then have to include this 
amount as part of his current income, thus "recapturing" a simi-
lar amount that had previously been taken as a deduction 
against income. 
In Revenue Ruling 77-401,122 the two individual members of 
a general partnership engaged in a road paving business had 
each contributed $15,000 to the enterprise. The partnership then 
purchased equipment costing $160,000 paid for by $10,000 down 
117. [d. § 465(a)(1). 
118. [d. § 465(b)(5). 
119. [d. § 465(a)(2). 
120. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.465-4, FED. TAXES (P-H) 'if 20,648.34 (1979) states: 
If a taxpayer engaged in a pattern of conduct which is not 
within normal commercial practice or has the effect of avoid-
ing the provisions of section 465, the taxpayer's amount at risk 
may be adjusted to reflect more accurately the amount which 
is actually at risk. For example, increases in the amount at 
risk occurring toward the close of a taxable year which have 
the effect of increasing the amount of losses which will be al-
lowed to the taxpayer under section 465 for the taxable year 
will be examined closely ..•• 
121. I.R.C. § 465(e). 
122. Rev. Rul. 77-401, 1977-2 C.B. 215. 
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with the balance of $150,000 secured only by the equipment. In 
its first taxable year, ending September 30, 1977, the business 
incurred a loss of $46,000. On September 29, 1977 the partner-
ship purchased $50,000 in U.S. Treasury notes with a cash down 
payment of $5,000, and a $45,000 note with full recourse against 
the partnership and secured by the Treasury notes. The interest 
rate payable on the $45,000 purchase money note was greater 
than the return received by the partnership on the $50,000 in 
Treasury notes. The Ruling held that the $45,000 note was not 
to be included in the calculation of the amount at risk. The Rul-
ing failed to give the reasons for its determination. It was silent 
not only as to whether the lack of economic viability (the fact 
that the interest expense exceeded the potential interest income) 
of the Treasury note caused or contributed to the exclusion, but 
also as to whether the fact that the Treasury note transaction 
was so unrelated to the general activity of the partnership was a 
factor. 
In a much clearer case of substance over form, Revenue 
Ruling 77_39128 involved a situation where an individual pur-
chased a used motion picture film, paying 20 % in cash and the 
balance with a full recourse note, the principal and accrued in-
terest on which were payable out of 50 % of the gross proceeds 
from the movie. If that was insufficient, payment was to be 
made ten years thereafter. Simultaneously, the maker of the 
note (the movie purchaser) entered into an agreement with a 
third party who was obligated, at the end of ten years, to lend 
the amount of any unpaid balance on the purchaser's note. At 
that time, and in such event, the purchaser would execute a one-
year nonnegotiable note payable to that third party for the 
amount borrowed. That note would be renewable, at the maker's 
option, from year to year until the debt would be fully paid from 
gross receipts derived from distribution of the film. This note 
was ostensibly full recourse. The Ruling held that the personal 
liability of the movie purchaser was illusory, and this in turn 
made his personal liability to the seller of the movie also illu-
sory. Therefore, only the amount of the 20% down payment was 
considered to be at risk. 
Another imaginative attempt to avoid the effect of section 
123. Rev. Rul. 77-398, 1977-2 C.B. 180. 
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465 was outlined in Revenue Ruling 78-413.124 There the tax-
payer purchased one of the programs in a television series from 
the owner of the series. For the same price, another investor 
purchased from the same seller another program in the series. 
Each investor paid part of the purchase price in cash and exe-
cuted a note for the unpaid balance. The notes were identical, 
including the maturity dates. Prior to the maturity date, pay-
ments were due only to the extent of and solely from a fixed 
percentage of the distribution proceeds from the purchased film. 
As part of the arrangement, the seller sold to each investor, for a 
nominal amount, the right to the unpaid balance on the other's 
note at maturity. Arrangements for distribution of the films 
were made for the series as a whole. The Ruling found that the 
taxpayer was not at risk for the amount of the note, because he 
was protected from economic loss because of his right to the un-
paid balance due on the other investor's note, which would ex-
actly equal any amount of money due on his note. 
What emerges is a comprehensive attack on the use of non-
recourse financing in certain situations. This attack criticizes not 
only the form of the transaction, but also its substance. Thus, 
where applicable, section 465 does not give competitive equality 
to financing that is either nonrecourse on its face or suSpect be-
cause of the relationship· between the lender and the borrower/ 
purchaser. In addition, where the circumstances indicate that 
there is no risk of loss,125 such amounts will not be considered to 
be at risk. 
IV. THE REMAINS OF CRANE 
Part I established that the Crane doctrine afforded nonre-
course liabilities competitive equality with other methods of 
purchasing property. Part IT examined some of the factors that 
were involved in turning competitive equality into a competitive 
advantage. Part ITI looked at a statutory attempt to control 
abuse of nonrecourse indebtedness. To determine the current 
relevance of Crane, we must examine two distinct areas, those 
activities subject to section 465, and those that are not. 
In the realm of section 465 activities, the Crane doctrine is 
124. Rev. Rul. 78-413, 1978-2 C.B. 167. 
125. Examples are discussed in text accompanying notes 123 and 124 supra. 
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no longer valid. In dealing with the abusive use of nomecourse 
financing, Congress has rescinded the notion of competitive 
equality at the heart of Crane. Only to the extent that leveraged 
deductions offset income earned by the particular activity, will 
the tax implications of nome course financed purchases equate 
with purchases financed with personal liability. Where the dif-
ference is more formal than real, such transactions will still be 
subject to the limitations of section 465. Thus section 465 says, 
in effect, that the way to gain full equality with purchases 
financed with personal liability is to become personally liable. 
Competitive equality is still available for transactions 
outside the scope of section 465. The law that was developed in 
Part I is still valid for these transactions. It must be 
remembered that the Crane doctrine does not hold that nome-
course debt must be included in basis. Rather, it holds that ab-
sent some other reason for excluding it, such as an amount that 
is too contingent, nomecourse indebtedness will not be excluded 
from basis solely because there is a lack of ·personal liability in 
the investment. 
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